

# On the discrete logarithm problem

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With Fré Vercauteren in the COSIC team



# Outline

- 1 Introduction
  - Presentation of cryptology
  - Presentation of the discrete logarithm
  - State of the art
- 2 Presentation of the different algorithms
  - The Function Field Sieve
  - The BGJT algorithm
  - GKZ descent
- 3 Results

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Protocols

SSL

PGP

Bitcoin

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Security schemes

El Gamal

RSA

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DLP

Factorisation

RLWE

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- We are interested in the last layer

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Given a triple  $(G, g, h)$  where  $G = \langle g \rangle$  is a group and  $h = g^x$  we want to compute the value of  $x$ .



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- In the case where  $p \ll p^\ell$ , we can solve the DLP in quasi-polynomial time.

# State of the Art

Chronology:

Introduction of the DLP	1976
FFS to solve DLP in subexponential time: $L(1/2)$	1979
Coppersmith algorithm: $L(1/3)$	1984
Joux $L(1/4 + o(1))$ algorithm	2013
BGJT quasi polynomial algorithm	2013
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Actual record : Granger, Kleinjung, Zumbrägel,  $\mathbb{F}_{2^{9234}}$  in 400,000 core hours.

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# The Function Field Sieve

The algorithm can be divided in 2 independent phases:

- 1 The factor basis resolution
- 2 The individual logarithm descent




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


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


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


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# Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux, Thomé

## Context

Finite field  $\mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta n}} = \mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta}}[X]/(f(X)) \equiv$  polynomial in  $\mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta}}[X]$  modulo  $f(X)$   
 $f(X) | h_1(X)X^q - h_0(X)$  irreducible of degree  $n$   
 $h_0, h_1$  of degree at most  $\Delta$

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## Systematic equation

$$X^q - X = \prod_{\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_q} (X - \alpha)$$

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$$(aP+b)^q(cP+d) - (aP+b)(cP+b)^q = (cP+d) \prod_{\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_q} (aP+b - \alpha(cP+d))$$

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## Systematic equation

$$\frac{1}{h_1^{\deg P}} (\text{degree } \deg(P)(\Delta + 1) \text{ polynomial}) = \lambda \prod_{i=0}^q \text{linear polynomials in } P$$



# BGJT: Sum up

## Heuristic

For  $q^\delta$  big enough, the matrix  $\mathcal{H}_P$  where columns correspond to elements of  $\mathbb{F}_{q^\delta}$  and rows correspond to a relation derived from the systematic equation is full rank.

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## Trade-offs

- We are limited by matrix algorithms over  $\mathcal{H}_P$
- We relates  $\log P$  with at least  $q^2$  logarithms of smaller polynomials  
→ many recursions

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Basic Idea:

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## Basic Idea:

- We know how to express an irreducible degree 2 polynomial in term of degree 1 polynomials
  - An irreducible degree  $2^m$  polynomial in  $\mathbb{F}_q$  is an irreducible degree 2 polynomial in  $\mathbb{F}_{q^{2^{m-1}}}$
- ⇒ We know how to express an irreducible degree  $2^m$  polynomials in term of irreducible degree  $2^{m-1}$  polynomials

# Degree $2^m$ Descent

$$\mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta 2^{m-1}}}$$

$$|$$

$$\mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta 2^{m-2}}}$$

$$\vdots$$
$$\vdots$$

$$\mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta 4}}$$

$$|$$


$$\mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta 2}}$$

$$|$$

$$\mathbb{F}_{q^{\delta}}$$


$$\textcircled{2^m}$$

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





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# Analyse of the Method

- No heavy linear algebra during descent phase
- Restrictive conditions to be used along with other descent methods ( $P$  irreducible of degree  $k \cdot 2^m$  to do  $m$  descent steps)
- Relation between  $P$  and  $(q + 2)^m$  degree 1 polynomials for a  $2^m$ -descent
- Can be enhanced to be space-efficient

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# Overview of the Results and Implementation Notes

- 1073 lines of Magma code
- The BGJT algorithm is suitable only for very big examples that cannot be implemented yet
- The GKZ algorithm is on average  $40\times$  faster than Coppersmith algorithm on a 204 bits field

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\* Demo \*

- The new **GKZ** algorithm change the **FFS** ecosystem by putting the bottleneck on the factor basis solving instead of the descent
- We started to work on this purpose improving this phase using different relations for the linear phase
- The descent tree quality can still be improved
- There is still many way not explored to improve the algorithm both theoretically and in practice



# References



Razvan Barbulescu, Pierrick Gaudry, Antoine Joux, and Emmanuel Thomé.

A quasi-polynomial algorithm for discrete logarithm in finite fields of small characteristic.

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Robert Granger, Thorsten Kleinjung, and Jens Zumbrägel.


On the powers of 2.

Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2014/300, 2014.

<http://eprint.iacr.org/>.

Thank you for your attention,  
Feel free to ask questions

# How to improve the memory efficiency of GKZ



We make the computations in a depth-first way.

## Future works?

- Exploit the liberty that the choice of  $h_1$  and  $h_0$  gives us
- Try to make a bounded expansion descent ( $1 \rightarrow k$  instead of  $1 \rightarrow q$  descent)
- Automatize the choice of the polynomial expansions like Kleinjung did for the NFS
- Evaluate the efficiency of the different descent to build a portfolio algorithm

# About Sparse Matrix Algorithms

A sparse matrix algorithm take into account the fact that the matrix is sparse and keeps this property during the operations.

Usually they used matrix-vector product operations as they are cheap in this configuration (for a  $n \times m$  matrix with at most  $p$  elements per row the cost of one matrix-vector product is  $p \times n$ ).

Some matrix algorithms we used:

- Block Wiedemann Algorithm implemented in `gpolinsolve` from Loria
- Block Lanczos Algorithm implemented in Magma
- Gaussian Elimination (not sparse matrix algorithm) when the matrix is small enough